Thriving in the Online Environment: Creating Structures to Promote Technology and Civil Liberties by Sutherland, Daniel W.
Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 25 Issue 1 Article 1 
2017 
Thriving in the Online Environment: Creating Structures to 
Promote Technology and Civil Liberties 
Daniel W. Sutherland 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, Internet Law 
Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel W. Sutherland, Thriving in the Online Environment: Creating Structures to Promote Technology and 
Civil Liberties, 25 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech (2017). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol25/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 




THRIVING IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT: 
CREATING STRUCTURES TO PROMOTE 
TECHNOLOGY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Daniel W. Sutherland1 
The online environment is dramatically impacting our world. A global re-
search organization has concluded that there are now more mobile devices in 
the world than there are people, and that these devices are multiplying five 
times faster than the human population.2  In Riley v. California, Chief Justice 
John Roberts observed that “modern cell phones . . . . are now such a pervasive 
and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might con-
clude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”3 One commentator 
rightly observed that the “Internet . . . . has become the backbone to the 21rst 
Century infrastructure[.]”4  IBM CEO Ginni Rometty has said that data “is the 
phenomenon of our time. It is the world’s new natural resource. It is the new 
basis of competitive advantage, and it is transforming every profession and 
industry.”5  It is commonly estimated that ninety percent of all the data in the 
world has been generated in the past three years.6  This new age is bringing 
                                                                
 1 Daniel W. Sutherland is the Associate General Counsel for the National Protection 
and Programs Legal Division within the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the 
General Counsel.  From 2003 to 2009, he was the Department’s Officer for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties.  The views expressed in this article do not represent the Department of 
Homeland Security and are entirely those of the author.   This article is based on Mr. Suther-
land’s remarks at the Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology Symposium, Cy-
bersecurity and Privacy in the Internet Economy: Information Sharing, Data Security, and 
Intellectual Property,” March 1, 2016. 
 2 Zachary Davies Boren, There Are Officially More Mobile Devices Than People in 
The World, THE INDEPENDENT, (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/there-are-officially-more-mobile-devices-than-people-in-the-
world-9780518.html. 
 3 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
 4 Dan Perrin, Cyber education is necessary for the future of mankind, WASH. EXAMIN-
ER (Sept. 5, 2016, 12:04 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/cyber-education-is-
necessary-for-the-future-of-mankind/article/2600936. 
 5 Ginni Rometty, Chairman, President & CEO, IBM, IBM Security Summit: New 
Ways of Thinking about Enterprise Security (May 14, 2015). 
 6 Big Data: For better or worse: 90% of world’s data generated over last two years, 
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concrete changes to our economic activities, to how we learn, to our enjoyment 
of sports and music, and to our understanding and practice of religion. 
However, there are potential risks that must be addressed. The security of 
the data that is now online is one such risk.  How this explosion of data im-
pacts our civil rights, civil liberties and privacy is another.  Now foreign gov-
ernments and private sector entities have access to treasure troves of data about 
our movements through the day, the books we read and the people we associ-
ate with.  As information is becoming the new coin of the realm, the appropri-
ate uses of that information are becoming, and will remain, a core issue.  In an 
online environment, civil rights, civil liberties and privacy are not a niche issue 
to be considered, but become a fundamental matter that must be addressed. 
One method for addressing civil rights, civil liberties and privacy challenges 
is to create structures that will help our institutions of government and com-
merce to better understand these issues and devise strategies to address them.   
In fact, government and private sector entities are creating such structures – 
organizations that work on the inside, that are welcomed as colleagues, that 
identify issues at an early stage, and that give advice on how to design pro-
grams and capabilities in ways that enhance privacy, civil rights and civil liber-
ties.  These structures can help build the public’s confidence that the govern-
ment and corporations can be trusted to handle data with discretion and effec-
tiveness.  This article will describe two organizations within the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security that have had a valuable impact on the way that 
security policies are being crafted.  It will also identify other similar organiza-
tions in the public and private sectors. Finally, it will examine a case study – a 
cybersecurity capability that has been dramatically influenced by the inclusion 
of privacy and civil liberties professionals from the outset. 
STRUCTURES FOR ENHANCING CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. Overview of the Homeland Security Act 
In 2003, the President signed the Homeland Security Act. The new law 
brought together twenty-two federal agencies and over 180,000 employees 
with the mission of guarding the nation’s borders, enhancing the security of 
America’s airports, and helping build resilience of the country’s infrastructure.7 
The Homeland Security Act also included several innovative steps, including 
                                                                                                                                                    
SCIENCE DAILY (May 22,  
2013), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm 
 7 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 2-230 (2012). 
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the creation of two positions dedicated solely to the protection of civil rights 
and civil liberties. The Congress thereby created a unique model of decision-
making: for the first time in the federal government, an agency has two mem-
bers of the senior leadership, reporting directly to the Cabinet Secretary, to 
focus solely on how the agency’s decisions impact individual liberties. 
B. The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
The Homeland Security Act required that the President appoint an Officer 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to “assist the Secretary in the performance 
of the Secretary’s functions[.]”8  Section 705 of the Homeland Security Act 
gives the Officer several tasks.  The first is an investigative function – when a 
citizen has a civil rights-related complaint, the Officer shall “review and assess 
information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of the De-
partment . . . .”9  The second task is to develop and shape policy wherein the 
Officer shall “assist the Secretary, directorates, and offices of the Department 
to develop, implement, and periodically review Department policies and pro-
cedures to ensure that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appro-
priately incorporated into Department programs and activities. . . .”10 The third 
major task is a compliance function – to review programs to ensure the De-
partment’s actions are in accordance with “constitutional, statutory, regulatory, 
policy, and other requirements related to the civil rights and civil liberties of 
individuals affected by the programs and activities of the Department. . . .”11 In 
all its work, the Officer is required to coordinate with the Department’s Priva-
cy Officer.12 
Thus, Congress created a unique civil rights office.13 While other federal 
agencies had offices that focus on civil rights, this was the only office that in-
cluded “and Civil Liberties” in the title.14  The title shows that the Office ad-
dresses issues at the intersection of national security, civil rights, and civil lib-
                                                                
 8 Id. at § 103(d) (2012). 
 9 Id. at § 705(a)(1) (2012). 
 10 Id. at § 705(a)(3) (2012). 
 11 Id. at § 705(a)(4) (2012). 
 12 Id. at § 705(a)(5) (2012). 
 13 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: OFF. FOR C.R. & C.L., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLE-
MENTATION OF SECTION 705 OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES 12 (2004), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CRCL-ReportJun04.pdf [hereinafter DHS REPORT TO 
CONG.]. 
 14 Daniel W. Sutherland, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, DHS, Homeland 
Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: A One-Year Review (July 1, 2004). 
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erties.15  Moreover, the Office has a distinctive internal function – assisting the 
senior leadership to develop policies and initiatives in ways that protect civil 
rights and civil liberties.  The Office also has the simultaneous function of 
providing compliance reviews and investigations of complaints.  Finally, the 
Office also has the responsibility for overseeing the Department’s equal em-
ployment opportunity program.16 This brings all civil rights-related issues un-
der one office, including those with regard to the Department’s own employees 
and those with regard to how the Department’s programs impact the general 
public.17 
Substantial investment has been made in this function.  Secretary Thomas 
Ridge18  decided that the Officer would be part of the senior leadership of the 
Department, reporting directly to him, and the Congress later codified that de-
cision.19  Moreover, the Department has committed substantial resources to the 
Office.20  The Office’s budget is $21.8 million, which funds approximately 90 
employees and several substantial programs.21  The Congress and the Depart-
ment have been so pleased with the contributions of the Office for Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties that they have expanded its role (adding several new provi-
sions into the authorizing language in Section 705 of the Homeland Security 
Act) and its budget (moving from a staff of approximately 40 in 2004 to a staff 
of almost 100 currently).22 
The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties makes its contributions in 
several areas.   One of the key elements of Office’s mission is to provide pro-
active advice to the senior leadership of the Department.23  In its most recent 
Annual Report to Congress, the Office states its first mission as, “[p]romoting 
respect for civil rights and civil liberties in policy creation and implementation 
by advising Department leadership and personnel, and state and local part-
ners.”24  The Office has had broad impact across the Department, including 
                                                                
 15 DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra note 13. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Thomas J. Ridge, Homeland Security Secretary 2003-2005, DHS, 
https://www.dhs.gov/thomas-j-ridge (last updated May 16, 2016). 
 19 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); see also DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC.: OFF. FOR C.R. & C.L., FISCAL YEAR 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 
(2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-fy-2015-annual-report.pdf 
[hereinafter DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT]. 
 20 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 19. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Cf. Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 705 of the Homeland Security 
Act and the Establishment of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (June 2004); see 
also DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT at iv. 
 23 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT at 11. 
 24 Id. at 5. 
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shaping new screening protocols at airports, improving immigration processes, 
building civil liberties protections into cybersecurity policies, enhancing intel-
ligence analysis, and improving conditions in detention facilities.25 
Two examples illustrate the Office’s impact on policy.  In the first months of 
the new Department, the Office was an integral part of the Department’s re-
view of the Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General report on the 
treatment of aliens detained in connection with the September 11th terrorism 
investigations.26  As a result of that work, the Department sent guidance to all 
immigration officers directing that detainees be given notice of the charges 
against them within 72 hours of the time they are detained; established new 
detention standards to improve communications between detainees and immi-
gration officials, allowing for more oversight of conditions; and, established a 
policy that immigration officers make an individualized and independent deci-
sion on bond and the closing of hearings every time an individual is detained. 27 
A second example is in the technology area; the Office helped to create an 
innovative program to provide accessible technology to people with disabili-
ties.28 Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, requires the 
federal government to ensure that electronic and information technology is 
accessible to persons with disabilities.29 The law applies to all federal agencies 
as they develop, procure, maintain or use such technologies.30  This includes 
products and services such as computer hardware and software, telecommuni-
cations products, information kiosks, and web sites. Therefore, the Office for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties co-chaired a project with the Chief Information 
Officer to create the Office of Accessible Systems and Technology (OAST).31  
The purpose of this office is to “ensure that all electronic information and 
technology procured, developed, maintained, or used is accessible to DHS em-
ployees and customers with disabilities through a range of policy, training, 
technical assistance and compliance activities.”32 This innovative function has 
had enormous impact, including testing hundreds of IT and web-based apps, 
remediating tens of thousands of pages of inaccessible documents posted on 
the DHS websites, creating an Accessibility Compliance Center of Excellence, 
administering a robust training program, and creating a Department-wide 
helpdesk for accessibility questions.33 The office has also emerged as a recog-
                                                                
 25 Id. at 7-8. 
 26 DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra note 13, at 18. 
 27 Id. at 19. 
 28 Id. at 21. 
 29 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012); DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra 
note 13, at 21. 
 30 DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra note 13, at 21. 
 31 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 57. 
 32 Id. at 7-8. 
 33 Id. at 58. 
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nized leader across government; for example, it has in recent years helped lead 
a cross-government effort to develop a “trusted tester” program.34 
In addition to proactive policy advice and development, the Office has fo-
cused on areas such as training.  It created the “Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Institute” to provide training on a large scale to the Department’s large work-
force.35  In the first year of the Department’s existence, the Office became re-
sponsible for training law enforcement officers on the government’s policy 
against racial profiling.36  It has provided training to Department employees on 
a wide range of additional issues, such as screening involving religious travel-
ers, and has worked with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to en-
hance its training on Constitutional law.37 
The Office also contributes by convening forums for members of the public 
communicate with homeland security leaders.38  The Office has created regular 
community roundtables in 16 cities across the country and periodic meetings in 
other locations.39  There are two purposes for these roundtables: to enable citi-
zens to communicate their concerns directly with homeland security officials, 
and to explain the Department’s policies to citizens.40  These roundtables have 
significantly benefited Department leadership as they receive direct feedback 
on how programs and operations are being received, and then incorporate the 
best ideas into new policy initiatives.  This then produces greater trust between 
communities and homeland security officials.41 
Finally, the Office has made an impact on the Department through its role in 
investigating and resolving complaints from the public that the Department has 
in some way violated civil rights or civil liberties.42  This internal audit func-
tion is incredibly valuable to the Department’s leadership.43 First, it provides 
early warning signs of potential abuses. Second, it allows them the opportunity 
to resolve issues at an early stage, often before problems become the subject of 
litigation, Congressional oversight or public outcry.  Finally, it promotes public 
                                                                
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 11. 
 36 See Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/civil-
rights-and-civil-liberties-institute, (last visited Oct. 7, 2016); see also DHS 2015 FISCAL 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 16. 
 37 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-
and-civil-liberties-institute, (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 38 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: OFF. FOR C.R. & C.L., FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS 11 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-fy-2014-
annual-report_0.pdf [hereinafter DHS 2014 FISCAL REPORT]. 
 39 Id. at 13. 
 40 Id. at 11-12. 
 41 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 13-14. 
 42 Id. at 27. 
 43 Sutherland, supra note 14. 
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confidence because of the credibility of these investigations – the Office 
demonstrates to stakeholders that these investigations do result in concrete im-
provements undertaken by the Department. 
C. The Chief Privacy Officer 
The Homeland Security Act required that the Secretary appoint a Chief Pri-
vacy Officer.  Section 222 of the Act provides that the Chief Privacy Officer 
reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security.44  Thus Congress estab-
lished “the first statutorily required comprehensive privacy operation at any 
federal agency.”45 Then-Secretary Ridge stated that the Privacy Office “will be 
involved from the very beginning with every policy initiative and every pro-
gram initiative that we consider, to ensure that our strategy and our actions are 
consistent with not only the federal privacy safeguards already on the books 
but also with the individual rights and civil liberties protected by the Constitu-
tion.”46 
The Privacy Office’s scope and influence is not limited to the Department’s 
headquarters; it is enhanced by parallel privacy offices in components such as 
FEMA and the National Protection and Programs Directorate.47 The Chief Pri-
vacy Officer’s responsibilities fall into several categories. First, the CPO is 
responsible for privacy policy within the Department, which, under Section 
222(b), includes: 
assuring that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections 
relating to the use, collection and disclosure of personal information; . . . . 
evaluating legislative and regulatory proposals involving collection, use, and dis-
closure of personal information by the Federal Government; 
conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the Department or 
that of the Department on the privacy of personal information, including the type 
of personal information collected and the number of people affected; 
coordinating with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to ensure that – 
programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties and priva-
cy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and, 
Congress receives appropriate reports on such programs, policies, and procedures; 
and 
preparing a report to Congress on an annual basis on activities of the Department 
that affect privacy, including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of 
                                                                
 44 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 142(a) (2012). 
 45 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: PRIVACY OFF., ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 1 (2003-
2004), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_annualrpt_2004.pdf 
[hereinafter PRIVACY OFF. 2003-04 REPORT TO CONG.]. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Nuala O’Conner Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Keynote 
Address at the 25th International Conference of Data Protection Privacy Commissioners 
(Sept. 11, 2003). 
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the Privacy Act of 1974, internal controls, and other matters.48 
One example of how the Department has leveraged the expertise of privacy 
professionals has been in developing policies and protocols with the European 
Union.49  From the beginning of the Department’s existence the Privacy Office 
has worked closely with the Europeans on issues related to “passenger name 
record” data – information about people who are planning to fly to the United 
States.50  The office played a key role in advising the Department on the issues 
involved in obtaining this information.51  After the United States entered into 
an agreement with the European Union in 2004, the Privacy Office then took 
on an important role in implementing the terms of the “Passenger Name Rec-
ord” (PNR) agreement. For example, it posted “privacy statements that might 
be used by airlines, travel industry representatives, and central reservation sys-
tems.”52  The office was also responsible for annual joint reviews of the im-
plementation of the PNR Agreement, a key aspect of ensuring credibility with 
the European authorities. 53  These responsibilities associated with the PNR 
agreement continue, with the office in 2015 undertaking a Privacy Compliance 
Review of the Department’s implementation of the 2011 version of the PNR 
agreement.54 
Other examples of leveraging the expertise of the Privacy Office includes 
involvement with evaluating policy on unmanned aerial vehicles,55 reviewing 
the operations of all fusion centers around the country,56 and helping to shape 
the Department’s approach to “big data.”57 The Privacy Office invests a great 
deal in reviewing Department programs and operations to determine how those 
                                                                
 48 6 U.S.C. § 142. 
 49 PRIVACY OFF. 2003-04 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 45, at 11. 
 50 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: PRIVACY OFF., A REP. CONCERNING PASSENGER 
NAME REC. INFO. DERIVED FROM FLIGHTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE E.U. 2 (2008), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pnr_report_20081218.pdf [hereinafter 
PASSENGER NAMES]. 
 51 PRIVACY OFF. 2003-04 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 45, at 14. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF., ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 3 (2014-
2015), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhsprivacyoffice2015annualreport-
final-11102015.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG.]. 
 55 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF., FINAL ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 2 
(2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs-privacy-office-2014-annual-report-
FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FINAL 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONG.]. 
 56 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF., ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS ii (2009- 
2010), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_annual_2010.pdf [hereinafter PRI-
VACY OFF. 2009-10 REPORT TO CONG.]. 
 57 FINAL 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONG., supra note 55, at 2. 
2017] Thriving in the Online Environment 9 
initiatives measure up against federal privacy protection statutes58 and Depart-
mental policy.59  The Office’s compliance work “ensures that privacy protec-
tions are built into Department systems, initiatives, projects, and programs as 
they are developed and modified.”60  The Office uses tools such as Privacy 
Threshold Analyses, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), and Privacy Compli-
ance Reviews.61  These tools help to integrate compliance process into the De-
partment’s daily work and its rhythm of developing, deploying, and reviewing 
programs. By engaging with program managers at the earliest stages of pro-
gram design, the Privacy Office is able to ensure that Fair Information Practice 
Principles are understood and considered in the development stage.62  In fiscal 
year 2015 alone, the Office participated in the development of 47 new or up-
dated PIAs and published 27 Systems of Records Notices.63 
This compliance work has dramatically impacted the Department’s cyberse-
curity mission. The DHS website posts PIAs related to major cybersecurity 
programs (and also has several other PIAs on other cyber programs that are 
now retired).64 For example, privacy professionals have carefully examined all 
three generations of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection and prevention capabil-
ity and issued extensive PIAs on the programs.65 The PIAs document how the 
programs have been improved through the application of privacy principles, 
and enhance public trust and confidence because of the transparency of these 
reviews.66 
                                                                
 58 See Authorities and Responsibilities of the Chief Privacy Officer, available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/chief-privacy-officers-authorities-and-responsibilities, citing the Priva-
cy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 
and the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
 59 Privacy Office, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-office (last updated July 28, 
2016). 
 60 PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 54, at 30. 
 61 Privacy Compliance, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/compliance (last updated June 
10, 2016); Privacy Impact Assessments, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-impact-
assessments (last updated Aug. 24, 2015); Privacy Reviews and Investigations, DHS.GOV. 
https://www.dhs.gov/investigations-reviews (last updated June 17, 2016). 
 62 PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 54, at 30. 
 63 Id. at 2. 
 64 Cybersecurity and Privacy, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-and-
privacy (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). Privacy Impact Assessments have been posted on all 
three generations of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection program, the Enhanced Cybersecuri-
ty Services program, and the National Cybersecurity Protection System.  See 
https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-national-protection-and-programs-directorate-
nppd. 
 65 See Einstein, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/einstein (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) 
(“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the mission to provide a common base-
line of security across the federal executive branch . . . this common baseline is provided in 
part through the EINSTEIN system.”). 
 66 Privacy Documents for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), 
DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-national-protection-and-programs-
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The Office has broad impact across the Department through its extensive 
training programs.  The Office leads both in-person and web-based training 
programs, reaching thousands of employees every year through efforts such as 
new employee training, the “Compliance Boot Camp,” and training for fusion 
centers.67  Just as with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Pri-
vacy Office provides forums for the Department’s leadership to engage with 
interested stakeholders. It has established a formal advisory board, the Data 
Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, which meets regularly to study 
DHS programs and operations, provide feedback to the Department, and issue 
recommendations for improvements.68 Finally, the Privacy Office is also re-
sponsible for programmatic functions such as leading the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act program for the Department and administering the obligations in 
the Privacy Act.69 
The Chief Privacy Officer’s responsibilities are broad and designed to en-
sure that the influence of privacy professionals will be felt in all corners of the 
Department’s programs and operations.  Over the Department’s twelve years, 
privacy professionals have substantially impacted and improved the Depart-
ment’s programs and operations. 
D. Exporting the Model 
The Department of Homeland Security stands out because it has two civil 
libertarians in senior leadership – their sole motivation being protecting priva-
cy, civil rights and civil liberties.70 These officers provide preventative advice 
and serve as internal auditors, investigating concerns and ensuring compliance 
in such a credible way that it builds public trust and confidence. These officers 
have been given substantial resources, and have reach across the entire De-
partment.71 
The success of the Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Lib-
erties has led Congress and the Executive Branch to mandate similar offices 
across the Executive Branch.72  In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, which required enhanced 
                                                                                                                                                    
directorate-nppd (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). 
 67 PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 54, at 25. 
 68 Id. at 20. 
 69 Id. at 9, 20. 
 70 Daniel W. Sutherland, Security and Freedom: Honoring our Values, DHS.GOV (Dec. 
17, 2007), https://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2007/12/security-and-freedom-honoring-
our.html. 
 71 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS.GOV (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/civil-rights-and-civil-liberties. 
 72 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1 (2014). 
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screening of cargo entering the country, redistributed counter-terrorism fund-
ing, and authorized fusion centers.73 One of most significant provisions of the 
law was to require Cabinet agencies to “designate not less than 1 senior officer 
to serve as the principal advisor to” assist the agency in developing policies 
and programs in ways that comport with civil rights and civil liberties.74 Con-
gress thus required that the Departments of Justice, Defense, Treasury, Health 
and Human Services, and Homeland Security, along with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI), have a privacy and civil liberties office. The responsibilities for these 
offices are modeled on the authorities given to DHS’s Office for Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties and Chief Privacy Office: 
“assist the head of such department … in appropriately considering privacy and 
civil liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or imple-
menting laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or guidelines;” 
conduct reviews of “department … actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and 
related laws and their implementation to ensure that such department … is ade-
quately considering privacy and civil liberties in its actions;” and, 
ensure that the department has “adequate procedures to receive, investigate, re-
spond to, and redress complaints from individuals[.]”75 
Congress provided principals to guide their work: 
“that the need for power is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil lib-
erties;” 
“that there is adequate supervision of the use by such department, agency, or ele-
ment of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and, 
“that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.”76 
Therefore, other Cabinet departments now have the ability to benefit from 
structures similar to those that have been in place at DHS since 2003.  The 
Cabinet departments and the Congress are making decisions on how to fund 
each office and how to place the offices in the agencies’ organizational struc-
ture.  While the departments are deciding daily how to integrate these offices 
into the daily operations of the agency, the structures are in place. 
These civil liberties entities could benefit a wider range of government 
agencies and many private companies.  For example, consider if a major urban 
police department appoints a senior advisor to the chief of police who is fo-
cused on civil rights and civil liberties. If this senior advisor was given a sub-
stantial staff and resources, the police department would quickly benefit from 
improvements in training, in better policies and protocols governing SWAT 
teams, in policies for responding to crowd disturbances, and in engaging with 
                                                                
 73 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007). 
 74 Id. 
 75 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ee-1 (2014). 
 76 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ee-1(a)(1)-(3) (2014). 
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the community.  Similarly, a company that collects information about consum-
ers could build confidence and trust among its customers and regulators if it 
has a privacy office with resources and influence inside the organization. 
CASE STUDY: AUTOMATED INDICATOR SHARING 
Privacy and civil liberties professionals within the Department of Homeland 
Security have been able to strongly influence the development of policy and 
the tactical daily operations of programs. The Department’s cybersecurity pro-
gram offers a recent example of the impact privacy and civil liberties profes-
sionals can have. 
A. The Foundation for Information Sharing 
Cybersecurity has emerged as one of the country’s top national security 
threats.77  The Administration and Congress have therefore decided that the 
country must have “an ecosystem where as soon as a company or federal agen-
cy observes an attempted compromise, the indicator will be shared in real time 
with all of our partners, protecting them from that particular threat. 78  That 
means adversaries can only use an attack once, which increases their costs and 
ultimately reduces the prevalence of cyber attacks.”79 
Any analysis of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 must begin one year earlier, 
with the passage of the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 
(NCPA).80  This law codified the role of DHS’s National Cybersecurity and 
Communication Integration Center (NCCIC), and laid the foundation for the 
future legislation.81  The NCPA establishes the NCCIC as a central player in 
the federal government’s information sharing about cybersecurity risks with 
the private sector, as well as an entity that provides cybersecurity technical 
assistance and incident-response capabilities to the private sector upon re-
quest.82 Moreover, the NCPA authorizes the NCCIC to develop and regularly 
exercise cyber incident response plans. The NCPA makes clear that the 
                                                                
 77 Sandra I. Erwin, Stew Magnuson, & Jasmin Tadjdeh, Top Five Threats to National 
Security in the Coming Decade, NAT’L DEF. INDUS. ASS’N (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/november/pages/topfivethreatstonati
onalsecurityinthecomingdecade.aspx. 
 78 Automated Indicator Sharing, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/ais# (last visited Oct. 
17, 2016). 
 79 Id. 
 80 National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 
(2014). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
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NCCIC’s information sharing and technical assistance authorities are not ex-
plicitly limited to critical infrastructure but rather apply more broadly to feder-
al and non-federal entities. 83   Almost exactly one year later, the President 
signed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.84 
B. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
Background 
As a result of the 2014 NCPA, and under the authority of Presidential Policy 
Directive 21, the Department of Homeland Security began developing a capa-
bility that would allow machine-to-machine sharing of cyber threat indicators.85  
For the past several years, the Department joined many organizations in shar-
ing information about cybersecurity threats, but the sharing was primarily con-
ducted through humans – that is, a company or security researcher would iden-
tify a vulnerability and either send an email to the NCCIC or call the service 
desk.86  Analysts would then review the information, compare it to other data 
available to the NCCIC, and, if appropriate, email it to various organizations 
for their action.  This form of information sharing has been important; for the 
first time, organizations have begun sharing critical data between each other, 
with the government, across sectors and across governments.87 
While significant, this form of sharing involves humans and therefore does 
not move at the speed necessary.  Therefore, the Department began to pilot an 
automated capability, where machines could communicate important cyberse-
curity threats and measures to defend against those threats directly with other 
machines.  The Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) initiative was designed to 
be a capability that receives, processes, and disseminates cyber threat indica-
tors in real-time.88 
In December of 2015, Congress turned this initiative into a mandate.  Under 
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, the Department of Homeland Security is re-
quired to “develop and implement a capability and process” that “shall accept 
from any non-Federal entity in real time cyber threat indicators and defensive 
                                                                
 83 Id. 
 84 The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015). 
 85 Press Release, The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastruc-
ture Security and Resilience: PPD-21, (Feb. 12, 2013) (on file with author). 
 86 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, DHS.GOV, 
https://www.dhs.gov/national-cybersecurity-and-communications-integration-center (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/ais (last visited 
June 21, 2016). 
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measures.”89 The DHS capability shall “be the process by which the Federal 
Government receives cyber threat indicators and defensive measures . . . that 
are shared by a non-Federal entity with the Federal Government . . . .”90 DHS 
was directed to receive those submissions by electronic mail, an interactive 
form on an Internet website, or through a “real time, automated process be-
tween information systems . . . .”91 
Under the law, the Secretary of Homeland Security was required to certify 
to the Congress that the automated process was functional: 
[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security shall . . . submit to Congress a certification 
as to whether the capability and process required by paragraph (1) fully and effec-
tively operates . . . [as] the process by which the Federal Government receives 
from any non-Federal entity a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure under 
this title . . . .92 
Congress established an extremely aggressive timeline: this certification had 
to be made within 90 days of the date of enactment.93  Because the Department 
had been working on AIS, the Secretary was able to meet the Congressional 
mandate and certify that a “real time, automated process” is operational. 94  
Thus, the Department has initiated what will hopefully become a multi-
directional information sharing environment, allowing governments, compa-
nies and academia to block malicious intrusions before they occur. 
Types of Information to be Shared 
The Cybersecurity Act defines the specific types of information that can be 
shared under the real time process.  The Act establishes two types of infor-
mation that can be shared: “cyber threat indicators” and “defensive 
measures.”95  Each of these is very carefully defined.  The term “cyber threat 
indicator,” or CTI, is defined in eight sub-parts, as information that is neces-
sary to describe or identify: 
Malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patters of communication that ap-
pear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related to 
a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability; 
A method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerabil-
ity; 
A security vulnerability, including anomalous activity that appears to indicate the 
                                                                
 89 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(c)(1) (West 2016). 
 90 Id. at § 1504(c)(1)(B). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at § 1504(c)(2)(A). 
 94 Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), US-CERT., https://www.us-cert.gov/ais (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 95 6 U.S.C.A. § 1501(6) & (7). 
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existence of a security vulnerability; 
A method of causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or in-
formation that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to 
unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security 
vulnerability; 
Malicious cyber command and control; 
The actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a description of the 
information exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity threat; 
Any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such attribute is not 
otherwise prohibited by law; or 
Any combination thereof.96 
Guidance produced by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security 
provides specific examples that help explain the term “cyber threat indicator.”97  
A CTI could include a software publisher that reports on a vulnerability that it 
has discovered in its software; a security researcher that reports on the domain 
names or IP addresses associated with botnets; a company experiencing a dis-
tributed denial of service attack to its public-facing website could report the IP 
addresses that seem to be sending the malicious traffic; or, a managed security 
service company could submit a pattern of domain name lookups that it be-
lieves correspond to malware infections.98 
CSA also required that “defensive measures” should be included in the real-
time sharing environment. This complex term is defined in the statute: “[A]n 
action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied to an 
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting 
an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected 
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.” 99 
The DOJ/DHS guidance also tries to more specifically define the concept of 
defensive measures by citing several examples, including: an individual could 
share with others a computer program that identifies a pattern of malicious ac-
tivity in web traffic; a method for loading signatures into a company’s intru-
sion detection system; or a firewall rule that prevents certain types of traffic 
from entering a network.100 
                                                                
 96 Id. at § 1501(6). 
 97 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FED. ENTI-
TIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS & DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH FED. ENTITIES 
UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 4 (2016), https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/Non-
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DOJ GUIDANCE]. 
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 99 6 U.S.C.A. § 1501(7). 
 100 DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 7. 
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Incentives to Share 
Congress recognized that the private sector had to overcome a number of 
potential obstacles if companies are to participate in this information sharing 
environment. Therefore, CSA explicitly states that if a company shares CTIs or 
defensive measures, it “shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege 
or protection provided by law, including trade secret protection.”101 Moreover, 
proprietary information can be protected: “a [CTI] or defensive measure 
…shall be considered the commercial, financial, and proprietary information of 
such non-Federal entity[.]”102 Such communications will also be exempt from 
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and state and local disclosure 
laws.103  This type of information sharing will not be considered an ex parte 
communication with a federal administrative decision-making official.104 The 
statute also makes clear that these communications will not be considered an 
anti-trust violation for companies to join together to share cyber threat infor-
mation.105 Finally, the incentive that received the most notice and commentary 
was the Act’s liability protections.  CSA provides that “[n]o cause of action 
shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private entity, and such ac-
tion shall be promptly dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of a cyber threat 
indicator or defensive measure[.]”106 
Sharing within the Federal Government 
Congress wanted to ensure that DHS would pass the cyber threat infor-
mation it receives on to other federal agencies with responsibilities in this are-
na. Therefore, the CSA requires that DHS “ensures that all of the appropriate 
Federal entities receive in an automated manner such cyber threat indicators 
and defensive measures shared through the real-time process[.]”107 The Act also 
made clear that the automated process is not to be the exclusive method for the 
private sector to share cyber information with the Federal government – organ-
izations are free to continue to share information with law enforcement, if they 
have statutory obligations to report such information, or if they have contractu-
al requirements to share such information.108 
                                                                
 101 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(d)(1). 
 102 Id. at § 1504(d)(2). 
 103 Id. at § 1504(d)(3)(B). 
 104 Id. at § 1504(d)(4). 
 105 Id. at § 1503(e)(1). 
 106 Id. at § 1505(b). 
 107 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(c)(1)(C) (West 2016). 
 108 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A .§ 1504(c)(1)(E) (West 2016). 
2017] Thriving in the Online Environment 17 
Perceived Challenges 
There were, of course, a number of challenges raised as an information shar-
ing environment on cyber threats was discussed.   One of the key concerns was 
aggressively advocated by a number of civil liberties and consumer groups: 
that the government should not be empowered to accumulate vast treasure 
troves of data.  The advocates were concerned that CTIs and defensive 
measures would include sensitive Personally Identifiable Information, and that 
the government would not adequately protect this information.  As a corollary, 
there was concern that proprietary information of companies also would be 
accumulated by government and sloppily handled. 
One letter written by advocates several months before the legislation passed 
the Congress highlights the concerns: 
Revelations about the National Security Agency’s secret collection of the personal 
information of millions of Americans highlighted the critical need for more over-
sight of government intelligence agencies and protections of consumers’ sensitive 
personal information. Common sense would tell us that expanding opportunities 
for government surveillance is not the solution . . . Rapid and expansive sharing of 
cyber threat data between corporations and government agencies without suffi-
cient safeguards will increase the risk of misuse of that information.109 
Many agencies are at the forefront working together, implementing, and 
hosting this new real time, automated capability.   Because of the investment 
that DHS made to build its privacy, civil rights and civil liberties structures, the 
Administration and the Congress ultimately decided that DHS should be the 
host.110 Cong. Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Committee, said, “DHS has some of the strongest privacy protection mecha-
nisms in the federal government . . . . [and] [s]uch built-in privacy oversight is 
an important reason why DHS is the leading civilian interface for these ex-
changes.”111  Therefore, DHS’s privacy and civil liberties structures were put to 
the test by the requirements of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. 
C. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protections 
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security took action to address 
the privacy and civil liberties concerns that had been one of the most substan-
tial barriers to passage of CSA.  Congress inserted policy and operational pa-
                                                                
 109 Letter from Center for Democracy & Technology et al., Consumer Advocates, to 
Hon. Mitch McConnell, Senator, U.S. Senate (Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://cdt.org/files/2015/10/CISA_Letter_10.21.15.pdf. 
 110 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A §1504(c)(1)(C) (West 2016). 
 111 Michael McCaul, Chairman, U.S. Committee on Homeland Security, Safeguarding 
the Digital Frontier: The Way Ahead for American Cybersecurity and Civilian Network 
(Mar. 17, 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
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rameters, while the Department focused on the design of AIS. 
Policy and Operational Parameters 
Congress established limitations on how information can be shared. The law 
requires federal entities to review and remove any information that is shared to 
ensure that unnecessary personally identifiable information is not provided to 
the government.   This can be accomplished through human review (Section 
1502(d)(2)(A)) or through a “technical capability configured to remove any 
personal information . . . not directly related to a cybersecurity threat[.]”112 
Congress also inserted limitations on how cyber threat information can be 
used.  It required that information can be disclosed to, retained by, and used by 
any Federal agency only for “a cybersecurity purpose.”113 The only exception is 
if a government agency believes that information shared will be relevant to “an 
imminent threat of death, serious bodily harm, or serious economic harm, in-
cluding a terrorist act or a use of a weapon of mass destruction.”114 If a compa-
ny shares cyber threat information that implicated a “serious threat to a minor, 
including sexual exploitation and threats to physical safety,” then the govern-
ment can use it to prevent, investigate, disrupt or prosecute any such crime.115 
Congress also ensured that there would be extensive audits and reviews.116 
The Inspectors General of the agencies implementing AIS must submit a report 
every 2 years to the Congress that includes an “assessment of the sufficiency of 
the policies, procedures, and guidelines . . . . relating to the removal of infor-
mation not directly related to a cybersecurity threat that is personal information 
of a specific individual or information that identifies a specific individual.”117  
Moreover, within 3 years after the passage of the CSA the Comptroller General 
is required to submit to Congress a report “on the actions taken by the Federal 
Government to remove personal information from cyber threat indicators or 
defensive measures[.]”118 
Congress also required the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to 
join together to write guidelines to set parameters for the design of the capabil-
ity. CSA requires that the Executive Branch issue 4 sets of guidance surround-
ing this program: guidance to the private sector for how it can participate in the 
                                                                
 112 Id. at § 1504(b)(1)(E)(ii). 
 113 Id. at § 1504(d)(5)(A)(i). 
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information sharing offered by AIS;119 guidance to federal agencies for how 
they can participate;120 guidance for federal agencies for how to handle CTIs 
that the agencies receive;121 and, guidance “relating to privacy and civil liber-
ties which shall govern the receipt, retention, use and dissemination of cyber 
threat indicators[.]”122 
Through these guidelines, Congress required that the new machine-to-
machine capability had to be designed with a number of core privacy and civil 
liberties in mind, including: 
Ensuring that the seven foundational “Fair Information Privacy Principles” had to 
be incorporated into the design; 
Limiting the length of time that a CTI containing personally identifiable infor-
mation may be retained;123 
Notifying entities participating in AIS if they submit information that does not 
qualify as a CTI under the act;124 and, 
If any personally identifiable information has to be included with a CTI, ensure it 
is protected throughout the information sharing environment “to the greatest ex-
tent practicable.”125 
The DHS/DOJ Guidance builds on these principles by instructing companies 
to limit the information they attempt to share with the government.126  The 
Guidance does not leave this as a general concept, but goes into detail on spe-
cific types of information that could contain personally identifiable information 
and therefore should not be shared, including: 
Protected Health Information, including anything in the company’s files that re-
lates to an individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental health, and to 
that individual’s possible payment for medical services; 
Human Resource Information, defined to include sensitive data in an employee’s 
personnel file; 
Consumer Information/History, including information regarding goods an indi-
vidual purchases and personal credit; 
Education History, referencing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA); 
Financial Information, including “anything from bank statements, to loan infor-
mation, to credit reports;” 
                                                                
 119 DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 4. 
 120 6 U.S.C.A. § 1502(a); DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 4. 
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Information about property ownership; and, finally, 
Information on children under the age of 13 (citing the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA)).127 
Building Privacy Principles into AIS 
All of these procedural limitations included in the statute were sensible. 
However, these directions would not have been sufficient by themselves; fun-
damental steps need to be taken to address the privacy and civil liberties con-
cerns. Because the Department had invested heavily in privacy expertise and in 
ensuring that these privacy experts were embedded in the cybersecurity pro-
gram offices at the Department, it was possible and natural to insert privacy 
professionals into the design of the capability.  The capability had to be built 
by privacy professionals with privacy principles in mind. 
The work actually began after the passage of the NCPA in 2014, as DHS 
began to develop the contours of a real-time automated machine-to-machine 
sharing capability.128  At that time, the NPPD Privacy Office129 conducted an 
extensive Privacy Impact Assessment of AIS; the PIA was first version was 
published just weeks before the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 was enacted, and an 
updated version was published 90 days after the law was passed.130 
With the parameters laid out in the statute, the DHS/DOJ Guidance, and the 
PIA, DHS’s design team went to work. The team designed AIS with stages in 
mind: the capacity to share or disseminate CTIs; and the capacity to receive 
CTIs from others, then filter or sanitize data that is received, perform any hu-
man analysis that is necessary; and disseminate those CTIs.131   Receiving CTIs 
from the private sector is what most worried civil liberties advocates, particu-
larly whether companies would indiscriminately share personal information 
with the government.132  The AIS design team decided to limit even the possi-
bility that PII could be shared by leveraging a structured format that allows 
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inputs only in certain fields.133  That is, the capability only allows machines to 
insert certain fields of data into what is referred to as the AIS Profile, and very 
few fields even allow the insertion of personally identifiable information. The 
DHS/DOJ Guidance explains, “[S]tandardized fields in structured formats can 
be used to establish a profile that limits the type of information in a cyber 
threat indicator[.] DHS’s Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) initiative uses 
this means of controlling the type of information that may be shared using the 
automated system[.]”134 
By limiting the information that can be submitted, the design team was able 
to resolve many of the core concerns. For example, the DHS/DOJ guidance 
states that a spear phishing email might be the source of a possible CTI.  In the 
alleged phishing email, the “from” or “sender” line of the email would be criti-
cal for analysts to have; they must be able to understand who the sender is.  If 
there is a malicious URL in the body of the email, that is also critical to ana-
lysts.  Analysts would also need to be given access to any malware files that 
are attached to the email, and possibly to the “subject” line.135  However, in-
formation in the “to” is not particularly relevant to the investigation and could 
contain personally identifiable information.  The guidance states, “The name 
and e-mail address of the targets of the email (i.e., the “To” address), however, 
would be personal information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat and 
therefore should not typically be included as part of the cyber threat indica-
tor.”136 The PIA concludes that 
“Much of the information within an indicator is centered on an observable fact 
about the cyber threat. For example, a cyber threat indicator has a variety of ob-
servable characteristics: a malicious email, internet protocol (IP) addresses, file 
hashes, domain names, uniform resource locators (URLs), malware files, and 
malware artifacts (attributes without a file).  The specificity and nature of the ob-
servable facts are designed to reduce the risk that a cyber threat indicator contains 
personal content or information inappropriate to share.”137 
The story is similar with defensive measures.  As the term is defined in stat-
ute, it does not include information that can be personally identifiable; instead, 
“it will generally consist principally of technical information that can be used 
to detect and counter a cybersecurity threat.”138 
Therefore, extensive precautions were taken to ensure that personally identi-
fiable information would not be submitted.  If it is, the AIS capability reviews 
and sanitizes information received to ensure that scrubs are done before any 
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data is disseminated.139  DHS employs various sanitization techniques to re-
move any remaining PII not necessary to understanding the cyber threat.140  If 
an automated technique is not available and/or able to remove PII within a data 
element, then that data element is placed in a queue for human review and not 
shared until appropriately resolved. As the PIA states, 
“DHS uses the AIS Profile to standardize the indicator and defensive measure in-
formation and implement a series of automated and manual processes to ensure 
that unrelated information is removed from the cyber threat indicator or defensive 
measure before it is disseminated to the AIS participants.  Using the AIS Profile in 
this manner further minimizes privacy, civil liberties, and other compliance risks 
that may arise when PII and other sensitive information is submitted.”141 
Designing the capability in this manner presented more than privacy and 
civil liberties benefits – it also enables the technology to function more effi-
ciently. As the PIA explains, “By narrowly scoping the AIS Profile to those 
definitions [provided in the statute], the expected content of AIS submissions 
is predictable, thus more easily enabling the usage of automated privacy en-
hancing controls.”142 
The design of the AIS capability could only be provided by, and with the 
support of, privacy experts.   Because they were part of the AIS design team, 
these concepts were built into the capability.  Combined with the procedural 
protections included in the statute and the guidance documents, the public can 
be assured that the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 
will be undertaken in a way that respects our core values. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the life of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Privacy Office have made substantial con-
tributions to improving security programs and operations.  The Congress in-
tended for these then-unique positions to help shape Departmental policy and 
build greater public confidence in the new Cabinet agency.  The impact has 
been felt widely, from conditions in immigration detention facilities to reforms 
in watchlisting to agreements with foreign governments. 
The Automated Indicator Sharing capability demonstrates that the civil lib-
erties structures built into the Homeland Security Act significantly helps the 
Department as it designs new security programs.  New technologies can be 
designed to enhance both privacy and security.  When both technology and 
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civil liberties addressed, public confidence that the government will handle 
data with discretion and effectiveness will greatly increase. 
